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The Right to Attention 
JASPER L. TRAN* 
“In the future, our attention will be sold.”1 
What marketing, contracts, and healthcare—specifically informed consent and 
mandatory ultrasounds—have in common is the right to attention from the 
information receiver. However, scholarship most often focuses on the 
communicator’s perspective (e.g., how much information the communicator 
discloses) or on the information itself, but surprisingly, not much on the receiver’s 
perspective. 
This dearth of scholarship from the information receiver’s perspective is 
problematic, because the information receiver is often the “little guy” in the 
conversation. We own and are entitled to our attention because attention is a 
property right and part of our individual dignity. Yet advertisement companies and 
scam artists freely bombard us with their “products” daily, resulting in our own time 
and monetary loss. Without recognizing the right to attention, contract formation 
and informed consent (just to name a few) are hollow and superfluous: contracting 
parties have no meeting of the minds, and informed consent is giving consent without 
being informed. States could continue to freely mandate ultrasounds for pregnant 
women against their wills as though their attentions were not really theirs in the first 
place. Similarly, other problems in our daily lives that involve attention would likely 
continue to go unaddressed. New emerging technologies make this an issue of 
increasing importance. 
This Article proposes legislation to recognize the right to attention as a statutory 
right, or alternatively, suggests that the courts recognize the right to attention as a 
common-law right based on the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the right to 
attention’s much larger, as-yet-poorly-defined bundle of rights includes, for 
example, the right to deny attention when demanded, the right to be left alone, the 
right to not be spammed and the right to not receive ads when such advertisement is 
unwanted or uninvited, the right to waive the understanding of an agreement, the 
right to give consent without being informed, and the right to not be required to 
receive information against one’s will. 
This Article is the first to identify the right to attention, including its much larger, 
as-yet-poorly-defined bundle of rights. This Article hopes to identify and illuminate 
the right to attention in hopes of generating further discussion and exploration of 
this novel bundle of rights. 
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 1. Mark Manson, In the Future, Our Attention Will Be Sold, MARK MANSON (Dec. 4, 
2014), http://markmanson.net/attention [https://perma.cc/6THB-CRSE]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine how you would feel if you were on a dinner date (things are going 
smoothly) then, all of a sudden, a Mariachi group stops by your table and plays their 
music for the next five minutes, interrupting your conversation and the enjoyment of 
your meal.2 That same feeling occurs when you are watching TV and a series of 
advertisements comes up; or when you are browsing the Internet and a series of 
pop-up ads appears; or when you are checking your e-mails, only to find out that 
more than half of your e-mails are spam ads; or worst of all, when you are using an 
iPhone app and an ad pops up demanding you to either pay for an ad-free version or 
have to watch the ads to continue using the app. We all feel bothered by unwanted 
and unwelcomed instruction of our attention, yet this occurs daily. 
In Stuart v. Camnitz,3 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit invalidated a 
provision of North Carolina’s new law4 requiring physicians to perform an ultrasound, 
display the sonogram, and describe the fetus to women seeking abortions, “even if the 
woman actively ‘avert[s] her eyes’ and ‘refus[es] to hear.’”5 Interestingly, the Fourth 
Circuit found this provision unconstitutional because it violated physicians’ free speech 
rights,6 but not because it violated the rights of the women subjected to mandatory 
ultrasounds against their will. Ironically, this new law is titled, “Woman’s Right to Know 
Act.”7 Rather than focusing on patient attention, North Carolina’s new law for mandatory 
videos or other forms of delivering information impermissibly compelled patients’ 
attention and distorted the information.8 This is neither the first time nor the only time9 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. Assuming you did not expect or welcome the Mariachi group’s presence. 
 3. 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015). Similar types of 
cases with an implied issue dealing with the right to attention will be likely to come up before 
the Supreme Court again soon. See infra Part II. 
 4. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85(b) (West Supp. 2014) (“display of real-time view 
requirement”), invalidated by Stuart, 774 F.3d 238.  
 5. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 242 (alterations in original) (quoting § 90-21.85(b)).  
 6. Id. 
 7. §§ 90-21.80 to -21.92 (West Supp. 2014). 
 8. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 9. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (addressing 
Pennsylvania law that, among other things: (1) required doctors to inform women about 
detriments to health in abortion procedures, (2) required women to give prior notice to their 
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that states have freely mandated pregnant women’s attention against their will—here, 
mandatory ultrasounds—but the women’s attention does not belong to the states.10 
Without recognizing the right to attention, contract formation and informed 
consent, just to name a few, are hollow and superfluous11: contracting parties have 
no meeting of the minds,12 and informed consent is giving consent without being 
informed.13 States could continue to freely mandate ultrasounds for pregnant women 
against their will as though their attention were not really theirs in the first place. 
Similarly, other problems in our daily lives that involve attention, for example, 
contract formation and informed consent, would likely continue to go unaddressed. 
New emerging technologies make this an issue of increasing importance.14 
In 1890, U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Louis D. Brandeis and his former 
classmate Samuel D. Warren published an article titled “The Right to Privacy” in the 
Harvard Law Review’s fourth volume.15 Little did they know that, 125 years later, 
their article would give rise to and shape a substantial body of constitutional law that 
inspired many civil rights movements and gave rise to many of the constitutional 
rights each individual has today.16 That article also inspired the writing of this 
Article, which celebrates the 125th anniversary17 of Brandeis’s and Warren’s article. 
                                                                                                                 
 
husbands, (3) required minors to receive consent from a parent or guardian prior to an abortion, 
and (4) imposed a twenty-four-hour hold before obtaining an abortion). 
 10. See infra Part I.C.2. Note that pregnant women could bring their problems to courts, 
but without the recognition of the right to attention, courts seem to struggle in addressing their 
concerns. See, e.g., Stuart, 774 F.3d 238 (invalidating North Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound 
law as unconstitutional because it violated physicians’ free speech rights). 
 11. See infra Part II.C. 
 12. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 13. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 14. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 15. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890).  
 16. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that Texas violated the liberty 
of two gay men when it enforced against them a state law prohibiting homosexual sodomy); 
Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing that individuals have a liberty 
interest that includes the right to make decisions to terminate life-prolonging medical treatments); 
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (finding privacy protection for an extended 
family’s choice of living arrangements, and striking down a housing ordinance that prohibited a 
grandmother from living together with her two grandsons); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 
(1976) (upholding a grooming regulation for police officers, and illustrating the trend toward 
limiting the scope of the “zone of privacy”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending the 
right of privacy to include a woman’s right to have an abortion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 
(1969) (unanimously concluding that the right of privacy protected an individual’s right to possess 
and view pornography in his own home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking 
down a state law prohibiting the possession, sale, and distribution of contraceptives to married 
couples); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (applying Meyer’s principles to strike 
down an Oregon law that compelled all children to attend public schools, a law that would have 
effectively closed all parochial schools in the state); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
(striking down a state law that prohibited the teaching of German and other foreign languages to 
children until the ninth grade); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (finding constitutional 
protection for the right of a citizen to possess and use small quantities of marijuana in his own home). 
 17. Coincidentally, 2015 also marks the 800th birthday of Magna Carta, one of the 
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What marketing18 and mandatory ultrasounds19—in addition to contract 
formation20 and informed consent21—have in common is the information receiver’s 
right22 to attention. Attention, by definition, is “the concentration of awareness on 
some phenomenon to the exclusion of other stimuli.”23 It seems so easy to disregard 
attention as something trivial. Things remain small when there is no discussion of 
them, but once we talk about them, they become big deals. Many things happen this 
way; for example, the current movements of feminism24 and #BlackLivesMatter25 all 
started like this, that is, with attention redirected to something that had previously 
been neglected.26 
Every exchange of information involves at least two parties, where one side 
communicates the information and the other side receives the information. Legal 
scholarship most often focuses on the communicator’s perspective (e.g., how much 
information the communicator discloses) or on the information itself,27 but 
                                                                                                                 
 
world’s great symbols of rights and the rule of law. 
 18. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 19. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 20. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 21. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 22. This Article does not get into the debate between rights and freedoms. Compare, e.g., 
RICHARD MCKEON, ROBERT K. MERTON & WALTER GELLHORN, THE FREEDOM TO READ: 
PERSPECTIVE AND PROGRAM (1957) (discussing the freedom to read), with Warren & Brandeis, 
supra note 15 (discussing the right to privacy). Nonetheless, the right to attention belongs in 
the “right” category. 
 23. 1 THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA: MICROPÆDIA 685 (15th ed. 2005) 
[hereinafter MICROPÆDIA] (describing early psychologists’ definition of “attention”). For a 
discussion on the competing definitions of attention, see infra Part I.A. 
 24. See generally MARY E. HAWKESWORTH, GLOBALIZATION AND FEMINIST ACTIVISM 
(2006). 
 25. See generally About the Black Lives Matter Network, BLACK LIVES MATTER, 
http://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/X989-88NZ]. The #BlackLivesMatter 
movement is a recent example of the race-color distinction as evidence of discussion of 
previously infrequently discussed issues. “Distinguishing color—light, black, in between—as 
the marker for race is really an error: It’s socially constructed, it’s culturally enforced and it 
has some advantages for certain people,” Toni Morrison says. “I Regret Everything”: Toni 
Morrison Looks Back on Her Personal Life, NPR (Apr. 22, 2015, 12:15 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/04/20/400394947/i-regret-everything-toni-morrison-looks-back-on
-her-personal-life [https://perma.cc/26AM-AP2B]. “But this is really skin privilege—the 
ranking of color in terms of its closeness to white people or white-skinned people and its 
devaluation according to how dark one is and the impact that has on people who are dedicated 
to the privileges of certain levels of skin color.” Id. 
 26. The pervasive racism and lack of women’s rights were unnoticed in the past, but in 
recent years, the movements have gained much momentum in the media, and people are taking 
notice. 
 27. There is, however, some research on the effectiveness of the information in reaching 
the recipient in the advertisement literature. See, e.g., ALBERT A. REED, KATE E. GRISWOLD, 
GEORGE FRENCH, JAMES BARRETT KIRK & LEROY FAIRMAN, ADVERTISING AND SELLING, 
VOLUME 24 (2011) (discussing attention, in terms of the timing to reach the recipient, in the 
context of advertisement). Also, attention’s effectiveness has been researched in the context 
of eyewitness testimony’s reliability. See, e.g., Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on 
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surprisingly, not much on the receiver’s perspective. This lack of discussion and 
dearth of scholarship from the receiver’s perspective is problematic, because the 
information receiver is often the “little guy” in the conversation. We own and are 
entitled to our attention because attention is a property right and part of our individual 
dignity.28 Yet advertisement companies and scam artists freely bombard us with their 
“products” daily, resulting in our own time and monetary loss.29 For example, “we’ve 
gone from being exposed to about 500 ads a day back in the 1970’s to as many as 
5,000 a day [in 2006],”30 and that number is still climbing. Of course, the degree of 
intrusiveness of advertisements and spam varies depending on their platform, 
whereas the more time consumed (or the more money lost), the higher the 
intrusiveness and vice versa.31 Furthermore, giving up the right to attention cannot 
be a condition of, for example, forming a contract.32 
This Article proposes legislation to recognize the right to attention as a 
statutory right or, alternatively, suggests that the courts recognize the right to 
attention as a constitutional right. Specifically, the right to attention’s much 
larger, as-yet-poorly-defined bundle of rights includes, for example, the right to deny 
attention when demanded, the right to be left alone, the right not to be spammed and 
the right not to receive ads when such advertisement is unwanted or uninvited, the 
right to waive the understanding of an agreement, the right to give consent without 
being informed, and the right not to be required to receive information against one’s 
will.33 
The right to attention could be in the form of: (1) a constitutional right, (2) a 
statutory right, (3) an economics/property right, or (4) a human right.34 It would 
primarily be a negative right rather than a positive right.35 To infringe on an 
individual’s right to attention, the government would probably be subject to some 
level of intermediate-scrutiny review, rather than rational basis or strict scrutiny.  
                                                                                                                 
 
Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 
1018–19 (1995) (discussing that violent events reduce the ability to focus attention, which 
makes recall of the details of an attack difficult); Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, 
Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Jury Decisionmaking, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 
(1989). However, there is not much legal scholarship on the information receiver’s side. 
 28. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 29. See infra Part I.C.1. Consumers make significant expenditures to stop the 
bombardment. See, e.g., Justin M. Rao & David H. Reiley, The Economics of Spam, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Summer 2012, at  87, 100 (estimating the annual costs of spam to consumers at nearly 
$14 billion and estimating firm spending on antispam solutions at $6.5 billion (citing Richi 
Jennings, Cost of Spam is Flattening—Our 2009 Predictions, MUSEUM EMAIL & DIGITAL 
COMM. (Jan. 28, 2009), http://email-museum.com/2009/01/28/cost-of-spam-is-flattening-our
-2009-predictions/ [https://perma.cc/QF37-RYGW])). 
 30. Caitlin Johnson, Cutting Through Advertising Clutter, CBS NEWS (Sept. 17, 2006, 
8:34 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/17/sunday/main2015684.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/WX8M-WZWY]. 
 31. See infra Part I.C.1.  
 32. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 33. See infra Part II.A.2 & notes 213–219. 
 34. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 35. See infra Part II.A.2 & note 220. 
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The right to attention generally would not arise if an individual were under an 
obligation36 or were to gain a privilege.37 Although it is hard to tell whether an 
individual is paying attention, his or her attention can be demanded through, for 
example, the administration of an exam.38 Even so, the demanding party would still 
need a legitimate interest to override an individual’s right to attention and require his 
or her attention for a finite amount of time.39 Another exception to the right to 
attention is that there is no right to attention in a human relationship, for example, in 
a domestic dispute.40 
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I defines “attention” and analyzes its value 
as a currency along with money and time. Part I then discusses the problems in 
marketing and mandatory ultrasounds when there is no right to attention. Part II 
explores the justifications for the right to attention and when the right to attention 
does and does not arise. Part II further applies the right to attention to contract 
formation and informed consent, and rebuts common criticisms. 
I. ATTENTION AND ITS VALUE 
A. Defining “Attention” 
The plain meaning of attention is “the act or state of attending esp. through 
applying the mind to an object of sense or thought; a condition of readiness for such 
attention involving esp. a selective narrowing or focusing of consciousness and 
receptivity.”41 Psychologists define attention as “the concentration of awareness on 
some phenomenon to the exclusion of other stimuli.”42 Economists43 define attention 
as “focused mental engagement on a particular item of information.”44 Given the lack 
of dispute in what attention means, this Article adopts psychologists’ attention 
definition—“the concentration of awareness on some phenomenon to the exclusion 
of other stimuli.”45 
Some claim to have an ability to multitask (i.e., splitting their attention to perform 
multiple tasks at once).46 Others are cynical of this ability, and claim attention cannot 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. North Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound requirement is not an obligation to pregnant 
women because the new law interferes with the pregnant woman’s right to abort. See Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 37. The quid pro quo for demanding an individual’s attention would be to give him or her 
a privilege in exchange. 
 38. Assuming he or she wants to pass, of course. Without paying attention, one would not 
likely pass an exam. 
 39. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 40. This human relationship is a personal relationship rather than a commercial one like 
in the case of advertisement, spam, and scams. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 41. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 79 (11th ed. 2003). 
 42. MICROPÆDIA, supra note 23, at 685. 
 43. The economists mentioned here are ones who study “attention economics.” For a 
discussion on attention economics, see generally infra note 86. 
 44. THOMAS H. DAVENPORT & JOHN C. BECK, THE ATTENTION ECONOMY: 
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW CURRENCY OF BUSINESS 20 (2001) (emphasis omitted). 
 45. MICROPÆDIA, supra note 23, at 685. 
 46. E.g., William H. Gladstones, Michael A. Regan & Robert B. Lee, Division of 
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be divided.47 To simplify the matter, this Article proceeds by only addressing an 
individual’s undivided attention. In short, having an individual’s attention means 
having his or her (full) focus. 
Humans can detect whether someone they are talking to is paying attention to 
them. It is not hard to tell whether an individual is paying attention in a conversation, 
either in person or over the phone/FaceTime/Skype. In other words, people value one 
another’s attention. But how is attention’s value measured? 
B. Attention’s Value 
“[A]ttention is what creates value.”48 
The most desired gift of love is not diamonds or roses or chocolate. It is 
focused attention. . . . Attention says, “I value you enough to give you 
my most precious asset—my time.” Whenever you give your time, you 
are making a sacrifice, and sacrifice is the essence of love.49 
Viewing attention as an asset is not new—scholars have already studied attention 
for almost a century now.50 In brief, attention has value,51 and its value is increasing 
as the demands for our attention are increasing.52 
                                                                                                                 
 
Attention: The Single-Channel Hypothesis Revisited, 41 Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 2 
(1989). 
 47. Multitasking would likely decrease productivity and performance quality. See, e.g., 
id.; Harold Pashler, Dual-Task Interference in Simple Tasks: Data and Theory, 116 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 220 (1994). 
 48.  DAVID HOULE & JONATHAN FLEECE, THE NEW HEALTH AGE: THE FUTURE OF HEALTH 
CARE IN AMERICA ____ (2011). 
 49. RICK WARREN, THE PURPOSE DRIVEN LIFE 127 (2002). 
 50. In the past, Karl Marx studied labor certificates, which arguably were a form of 
spending attention for money. See, e.g., KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME 8 
(C. P. Dutt ed., Int’l Publishers Co. 1938) (1875) (discussing labor certificates—as a form of 
spending attention for money—as a “certificate from society that [the laborer] has furnished 
such and such an amount of labour,” which “draws from the social stock of means of 
consumption as much as the same amount of labour costs”). In modern time, the entire 
marketing and advertisement industry is based on how much its ads can grab and retain the 
viewers’ attention. See Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
1151, 1194–97 (discussing attention markets as marketplace alternatives to regulation); see 
also Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014) (discussing 
the realities of a marketplace as mediated by technology and how digital market manipulation 
reveals the limits of consumer protection law and exposes economic and privacy harms). 
 51. See infra Parts I.B.1–.3. 
 52. See infra Part I.B.4. 
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1. Attention as Currency 
Nowadays, people associate currency with money.53 In fact, the definition of 
“currency” contains the word “money.”54 Money generally takes the form of bills, 
coins, and checks or credits through a financial institution (i.e., a bank). Starting in 
2008, money can take a new form, called “Bitcoin,” as a digital currency.55 
In the early nineteenth century, people attempted to use time as currency through 
the form of labor.56 Lately, the concept of time-based currency is making a comeback.57 
Indeed, people can theoretically spend time and money interchangeably: people 
exchange their time for money and money for others’ time. 
Besides money and time, a third form of currency is attention.58 In fact, the word 
“attention” is used in conjunction with the word “pay” in the phrase “to pay attention,” 
signaling its value as a currency. Like time, attention is scarce. Scholars are discussing 
that our attention span is getting shorter and shorter in the information age59 and even 
speculate that, in the future, our attention will be sold.60 In fact, we can spend attention 
like time61 or money62 interchangeably. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. E.g., CTR. FOR FIN. TRAINING, BANKING SYSTEMS 38 (2d ed. 2010) (“Most people 
associate the word [“currency”] with paper money . . . .”). 
 54. See, e.g., Currency, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse
/currency?s=t [https://perma.cc/KMF9-JZH9] (defining “currency” as “something that is used 
as a medium of exchange; money”). 
 55. See generally SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH 
SYSTEM (2008), available at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS78-2YJD] 
(identifying bitcoin as “[a] purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash [that] would allow 
online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial 
institution”). 
 56. See MARX, supra note 50, at 8 (discussing labor certificates as a “certificate from 
society that [the laborer] has furnished such and such an amount of labour,” which “draws 
from the social stock of means of consumption as much as the same amount of labour costs”); 
JOSIAH WARREN, TRUE CIVILIZATION: AN IMMEDIATE NECESSITY AND THE LAST GROUND OF 
HOPE FOR MANKIND 184 (Boston, J. Warren 1863) (discussing that, in 1827, Josiah Warren 
established the Cincinnati Time Store where people could purchase goods with labor notes 
representing an agreement to perform labor); JONATHAN R. ZATLIN, THE CURRENCY OF 
SOCIALISM 24–25 (2007) (discussing that Robert Owen established marketplaces and banks 
that accepted labor notes in London in 1832, but his efforts failed in 1834). 
 57. See, e.g., IN TIME (Regency Enterprises 2011) (fictional movie where time has become 
a universal currency that can be used to pay for day-to-day expenses and can be transferred 
between people or capsules). 
 58. See James G. Webster, User Information Regimes: How Social Media Shape Patterns 
of Consumption, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 593, 594 (2010) (“In this world, attracting and managing 
attention is a prerequisite for achieving almost any economic, political, or cultural objective. 
Attention might thus be thought of as the currency of a new economy.”). 
 59. See, e.g., RICHARD A. LANHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF ATTENTION, at xi–41 (2006) 
(arguing that our attention has decreased in the information age and discussing attention economics). 
 60. E.g., Michael H. Goldhaber, Attention Shoppers!, WIRED (Dec. 1, 1997, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/1997/12/es-attention/ [https://perma.cc/5FDE-ZNS4]; Manson, supra note 1. 
 61. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 62. See infra Part I.B.3. 
2016] THE RIGHT TO ATTENTION 1031 
 
2. Attention vs. Time 
“A leader’s most precious resource is not their time. It’s their focused attention. 
Time merely passes, while focused attention makes things happen.”63 An individual 
with focused attention “can have a significant impact in a minimal amount of time.”64 
Conversely, “all the time in the world is insufficient” for an individual without 
attention.65 
Both time and attention are scarce commodities. Worldwide, women have an 
average life expectancy of 71 years, while men have an average life expectancy of 
66.5 years,66 and there are only about 365 days per year and 24 hours per day. “No 
matter how much money you have, you can’t buy more time. There are only 24 hours 
in everyone’s day,” says Bill Gates.67 Like time, each individual only has a limited 
amount of attention to “spend.”68 
Some view time and attention interchangeably; others view attention as time’s 
subcategory—attention’s outer limit is time.69 For example, when an attorney 
charges her client for her time, that attorney supposedly pays attention to the 
client.70 However, this is not necessarily true all the time. An individual can give 
people the time of his or her day but, at the same time, not pay any attention to 
what is going on.71 For employees in a factory, time equates to opportunity cost 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. Ed Batista, To Stay Focused, Manage Your Emotions, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Feb. 2, 
2015), https://hbr.org/2015/02/to-stay-focused-manage-your-emotions [https://perma.cc
/X2CH-MTR6] (emphasis in original). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World Population Prospects: The 
2012 Revision, Highlights and Advance Tables, 17, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP.228 (2013). 
 67. Bill Gates, Three Things I’ve Learned from Warren Buffett, LINKEDIN PULSE (June 
12, 2013), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20130612065727-251749025-three-things-i-ve
-learned-from-warren-buffett [https://perma.cc/2R22-F2QX]. 
 68. Thus, attention economics treats attention as a scarce commodity. See infra note 86 
and accompanying text. 
 69. As such, they view attention as time’s subcategory by measuring attention under 
time’s unit. See, e.g., Jason Fried, What’s the Difference Between Time and Attention? A Lot., 
OBSERVER (Dec. 9, 2015, 10:01 AM), http://observer.com/2015/12/whats-the-difference
-between-time-and-attention-a-lot/ [https://perma.cc/JER8-ZE5P] (“Attention is a far more 
limited resource than time. . . . [For instance,] I may have 8 hours a day for work, but I probably 
have 4 hours a day for attention.”). 
 70. Cf. Demetrios Dimitriou, The Individual Practitioner and Commercialism in the 
Profession: How Can the Individual Survive?, 45 S.C. L. REV. 965, 973 (1994) (“The failure 
to focus on the client, forgetting that the value of the services rendered is measured by the 
client and not the lawyer, has resulted in clients’ perceiving lawyers as being interested only 
in making money, not meeting client needs.”). 
 71. Some call this not “being [mentally] present” or “being in the presence.” The opposite 
would be “being absent” despite one’s physical presence. See, e.g., Roger Fransecky, Are You 
Really Paying Attention? The Importance of Being Present, HUFFPOST HEALTHY LIVING: THE 
BLOG (Oct. 19, 2010, 8:27 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-fransecky/are-you
-really-paying-att_b_758025.html [https://perma.cc/3VSQ-4YPL]. 
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(i.e., the inability to be doing something else).72 The employer thus pays for the 
employee’s time even if the employee could just stand around waiting.73 The 
Fordism/Taylorism literature from the 1920s focused on how to optimize use of 
the employee’s time for the employer, largely through refinements of the assembly 
line idea.74 The allocation, though, was clear: employers paid for time, and they 
got to decide how to allocate the time they paid for. In some ways, routinization 
makes the value of the employee’s time less dependent on the employee’s level of 
attention (or skill).  
With lawyers, on the other hand, time spent without attention is valueless; yet, 
the attorney, not the client, controls the allocation of attention. This presents an 
intrinsic conflict of interest. For example, when an attorney bills his or her client 
for traveling time, that attorney could be spending his or her attention during this 
time to read up on materials for another client—an ethical issue of double or 
fraudulent billing.75 An attorney could also unethically bill for sleeping time, 
where he or she was not paying attention to the client’s matter per se. Thus, 
attention is arguably more valuable than time, even if time without attention is 
part of the price of accomplishing a task—attention is an assumed feature of time 
billed, at least for attorneys. 
3. Attention vs. Money 
 “In the future, our attention will be sold.”76 Unsurprisingly, others can make 
money using our attention. The marketing industry preys on our attention through 
advertisement.77 Advertisement demands our attention through many shapes and 
forms: newspaper ads, TV commercials, spam e-mails, spam phone calls, website 
pop-up ads, in-person sales pitches, etc. YouTube video posters and bloggers make 
money based on the number of views. Writers desire to formulate 
“attention-grabbing” sentences. Statistically, “we’ve gone from being exposed to 
about 500 ads a day back in the 1970’s to as many as 5,000 a day [in 2006],”78 and 
that number is still climbing. 
We can also save or make money by “spending” our attention. For example, 
coupon clippers spend their time—and thus pay attention to—collecting coupons to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. See, e.g., Emily Oster, Time Is Money: So How Much Is Yours Worth?, SLATE (Feb. 
6, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/02/time_is_ money
_opportunity_cost_can_help_you_figure_out_how_much_your_time.html [https://perma.cc
/5VMX-YC2C]. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See generally BERNARD DORAY, FROM TAYLORISM TO FORDISM: A RATIONAL 
MADNESS (David Macey trans., Free Ass’n Books 1988) (1981). 
 75. See generally Kevin Hopkins, Law Firms, Technology, and the Double-Billing 
Dilemma, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 102 & n.42 (1998). 
 76. Manson, supra note 1. 
 77. In fact, grabbing and keeping potential customers’ attention is the foundation of the 
entire marketing industry. See e.g., CAROL MCCLELLAND, GREEN CAREERS FOR DUMMIES 184 
(2010) (stating that marketing is about “[g]rabbing and keeping the customer’s attention”). 
 78. Johnson, supra note 30. 
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save money.79 Furthermore, some mobile apps80 even pay users in-app rewards to 
view thirty-second advertisements.81 
Although attention’s value increases with increasing demands and inelastic 
supply,82 the exact value for each individual’s attention might be difficult to quantify. 
The value to an advertiser of the ability to command attention has a discoverable 
price, but we lack an attention market83 that would reveal how much an individual is 
willing to pay to be free from such intrusions. Fortunately, at least one thing is 
certain: attention has value. 
4. The Economics of Attention84 
The term “attention” came to economists’ attention in the latter half of the 
twentieth century,85 and the study of attention economics treats attention as a scarce 
commodity to solve information-management problems.86 In fact, Nobel Laureate 
Herbert Simon87 warned: 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. See Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of 
Consumer Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 362, 366 (2007) (defining consumer rebates and 
coupons). 
 80. See generally Daniel Parisi, Recent Development, Mobile App Privacy: Developing 
Standard and Effective Privacy Tools for Consumers, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 240, 
240–45 (2014). 
 81. J.J. Colao, Watch Ads, Get Paid: Is This the Future of Ad-Supported Content?, 
FORBES (Mar. 1, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2013/03/01/watch-ads
-get-paid-is-this-the-future-of-ad-supported-content/ [https://perma.cc/DHX2-AS9D]. 
 82. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 83. See generally Goldman, supra note 50, at 1194–97 (discussing attention markets as 
marketplace alternatives to regulation); see also Eric Goldman, Data Mining and Attention 
Consumption, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY 
CONVERSATION 225, 230–32 (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006) 
(analyzing targeted marketing based on its costs in attention consumption). 
 84. For an in-depth discussion on the economics of attention, see generally LANHAM, 
supra note 59, at xi–41 (arguing that our attention has decreased in the information age and 
beginning the discussion of attention economics). 
 85. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World, 
in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40–41 (Martin Greenberger 
ed., 1971). 
 86. See DAVENPORT & BECK, supra note 44, at 2 (“What’s in short supply is human 
attention.”); TOM HAYES, JUMP POINT 73 (2008) (calling attention “the new crude oil”); 
LANHAM, supra note 59, at 8–9; Josef Falkinger, Attention Economies, 133 J. ECON. THEORY 
266, 268–69 (2007); Webster, supra note 58, at 594; Michael H. Goldhaber, The Attention 
Economy and the Net, FIRST MONDAY (Apr. 1997), http://journals.uic.edu/ojs
/index.php/fm/article/view/519/440. 
 87. See generally Herbert A. Simon—Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (last updated 2016), 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1978/simon-facts.html 
[https://perma.cc/HN8N-QNBQ] (winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1978). 
1034 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 91:1023 
 
 
[I]n an information-rich world, the wealth of information means a 
dearth of something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information 
consumes. [Information] consumes the attention of its recipients[,] . . . 
creat[ing] a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention 
efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might 
consume it.88  
Early use of labor (i.e., labor certificates) as currency was closely associated 
with attention.89 Economist Karl Marx’s labor theory of value explains that the 
value of a “thing” depended on the human time it took to produce it. Other 
economists’90 price theory explains that price reflects supply and demand.91 
Attention’s “value”—to put a price on attention—is increasing92 as the demands 
for our attention are increasing93 because the supply of our attention is finite and 
largely inelastic.94 Figure 195 illustrates this point, showing the effects of a positive 
demand shock with an elastic supply curve versus an inelastic supply curve, 
wherein the intersection near D2 on the inelastic curve has a higher price point than 
the intersection near D1 on the elastic curve as the demands increase from the 
starting point at the intersection near D0. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. See Simon, supra note 85, at 40–41 (emphasis added). 
 89. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 90. Other economists often derided Marx and his theories. See, e.g., Joseph V. Femia, An 
Image in a Curved Mirror: Pareto’s Critique of Marxist Science, in THE LEGACY OF MARXISM: 
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES, CONFLICTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 25, 26 (Matthew Johnson ed. 
2012) (“Opponents of Marxism have found [Marx’s] claims laughable. Karl Popper, one of 
the more prominent critics, derided Marx and his followers as scientific imposters, whose 
vague and elastic terminology allowed them to ‘explain away’ whatever phenomena that might 
seem to render their theory erroneous.”). 
 91. E.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & CARL E. WALSH, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 69–71 
(4th ed. 2006) (using the law of supply and demand to explain how prices are determined in 
competitive markets). 
 92. See Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech, User-Generated 
Ads, and the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 722 (2010) (“The ‘market’ for 
speech faces problems of access (or supply) intimately tied to problems of attention (or 
demand) . . . .”). 
 93. See, e.g., id. at 721; Manson, supra note 1. 
 94. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing attention’s outer limit as time, which itself is limited). 
 95. Jesse Edgerton, Estimating Machinery Supply Elasticities Using Output Price 
Booms 3 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2011-03, 
2010). The figure has been modified by adding D2 and its corresponding arrow. 
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Figure 1. Effects of a positive demand shock with elastic and inelastic supply curves 
C. The Problems Associated with Attention 
Attention has increasing value, yet an individual’s attention is up for grabs or 
demanded freely by advertisement, spam, and scams.96 In a recent Fourth Circuit 
case, doctors demanded the attention of women seeking abortions through mandatory 
ultrasounds based on North Carolina’s new law, “even if the woman actively 
‘avert[s] her eyes’ and ‘refus[es] to hear.’”97 The problems demonstrated here call 
for recognizing the right to attention.98 
1. Marketing: Advertisement, Spam, and Scams 
Attention has value,99 yet people treat attention as though it is free to grab.100 
Individuals presumably own their attention and can give it out at their free will. 
However, whether individuals can actually give attention out at their free will can 
depend on how disciplined they are. The underlying assumption is that individuals 
can control their own attention101 when, in reality, that might not be the case. An 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 97. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85(b) (West Supp. 2014)). 
 98. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 99. See supra Part I.B. 
 100. See MCLELLAND, supra note 77, at 189. Note that individuals could try to be insulated 
from distractions if they wanted to (e.g., by wearing earplugs or (noise-cancellation) 
earphones), but this would require them to put in their own efforts. 
 101. This Article assumes no use of pharmaceutical supplements to boost an individual’s 
focused attention (e.g., caffeine or Adderall). For a discussion on pharmaceuticals, see 
generally Jasper L. Tran, Timing Matters: Prior Art’s Age Infers Patent Nonobviousness, 50 
GONZ. L. REV. 189 (2014/2015). For a discussion on patents, see generally Jasper L. Tran, 
Rethinking Intellectual Property Transactions, 43 S.U. L. REV. 149, 152–57 (2015) 
(discussing components of a patent license); Jasper L. Tran, Software Patents: A One-Year 
Review of Alice v. CLS Bank, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 532, 534, 539–40 (2015). 
This Article also does not account for illnesses that affect an individual’s ability to control his 
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individual’s attention can be demanded through his or her sense of audio (through 
speech)102 or sense of vision (through images103 or video).104 
We live in an era of unstoppable distractions,105 where we are constantly 
bombarded with e-mails, text messages, Facebook,106 music, vehicle noises, etc. 
“[T]he power of marketing . . . is eroding from lack of attention.”107 The marketing 
industry is built on attracting and keeping people’s attention. 
A distraction108 is, by definition, “something that makes it difficult to think or pay 
attention.”109 Thus, a distraction is essentially an unwanted and unwelcomed 
intrusion on an individual’s attention.110 In fact, advertisements and spam111 are 
simply large-scale distractions that affect many people.112 Spam comes in many 
shapes and forms including spam e-mails and spam phone calls—especially with the 
                                                                                                                 
 
or her attention (e.g., Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)). For a discussion on 
pharmacotherapy and ADHD, see generally Jefferson B. Prince, Timothy E. Wilens, Thomas 
J. Spencer & Joseph Biederman, Pharmacotherapy of ADHD in Adults, in ATTENTION-DEFICIT 
HYPERACTIVITY DISORDER: A HANDBOOK FOR DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 826 (Russell A. 
Barkley ed., 4th ed. 2015). See also Eric Lindenfeld & Jasper L. Tran, Beyond Preemption of 
Generic Drug Claims, 45 SW. L. REV. 241 (2015) (discussing generic drugs); Eric Lindenfeld 
& Jasper L. Tran, Prescription Drugs and Design Defect Liability: Blanket Immunity 
Approach to the Increased Costs and Unavailability of Prescription Medication, 64 DRAKE L. 
REV. 111 (2016) (discussing prescription drugs). 
 102. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 92, at 724. Note that Tushnet does not limit her 
commentary to demands for aural attention. Many of her other examples are visual. 
 103. Cf. id. at 775–76 (discussing puffery in visual advertising and whether that puffery 
should be regulated). 
 104. See, e.g., id. at 739 (discussing example of a video ad); see also Stuart v. Camnitz, 
774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (invalidating North Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound law as 
unconstitutional because it violated physicians’ free speech rights). 
 105. However, the availability of 3D printing in the near future might mitigate these 
distractions because we will depend less on, and thus interact less with, other people for 
manufactured goods. For a discussion on 3D printing, see generally Jasper L. Tran, The Law 
and 3D Printing, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 505 (2015); Jasper L. Tran, To 
Bioprint or Not To Bioprint, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2015). 
 106. See generally James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 
1144–49 (2009). 
 107. KEN SACHARIN, ATTENTION! HOW TO INTERRUPT, YELL, WHISPER, AND TOUCH 
CONSUMERS 3 (2001). 
 108. Some also call this “noise.” See, e.g., W. Trammell Neill & Richard L. Westberry, 
Selective Attention and the Suppression of Cognitive Noise, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: 
LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 327 (1987). 
 109. Distraction, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/distraction [https://perma.cc/BQN9-VST3] (last updated 2015). 
 110. Note that wanted distractions also exist (often from our loved ones), but this Article 
focuses solely on unwanted and unwelcomed distractions. 
 111. “Spam[ming]” means sending the same message indiscriminately to a large number 
of recipients. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1195 (11th ed. 2003). 
 112. People use advertisements and spam interchangeably. The term “spam” carries a 
negative connotation. People generally view advertisements in a more positive light. 
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high frequency of advertisements in landline phones, more and more Americans are 
dropping landline phones to use cell phones exclusively.113 
When individuals becomes distracted, they lose their productivity and become 
inefficient at completing the task(s) at hand. The economic loss from advertisements 
and spam is enormous: for example, a lawyer with a billing rate of $150/hour who 
receives 2200 spam messages in a year would lose $900/year in billing to spam 
e-mails.114 In 2010, valid e-mail addresses around the world received about 100 
billion e-mails per day, 88% of which were spam.115 Companies spent about $6.5 
billion/year on anti-spam technology.116 Assuming an average person’s time is worth 
$25/hour and that it takes an average of five seconds to delete spam, spam costs users 
about $14 billion/year.117 Yet, advertisements and spam occur daily, and are in fact 
a multi-billion dollar industry.118 
The problem119 worsens in the cases of scams (i.e., fraudulent advertisements120) 
or spam. Although the unfortunate victim121 could initiate a legal action under fraud 
laws122 against the scammer, the scammers can “easily . . . cover their tracks,” leaving 
scams “widespread, difficult to detect, and hard to prosecute.”123 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. BLUMBERG & JULIAN V. LUKE, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH 
STATISTICS, WIRELESS SUBSTITUTION: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL 
HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JULY–DECEMBER 2013 1 (2014) (“Preliminary results from the 
July–December 2013 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) indicate that the number of 
American homes with only wireless telephones continues to grow.”). 
 114. Don Passenger & Jeff Kirkey, Un-Canned Spam: Getting It Back in the Tin, MICH. B. 
J., Mar. 2003, at 36, 36. Note that this assumes an average person can expect 2200 spam 
e-mails a year and that readers would look at the e-mails to ensure their legitimacy. 
 115. Rao & Reiley, supra note 29, at 87 (citing MESSAGING ANTI-ABUSE WORKING GRP., 
EMAIL METRICS REPORT #14 – THIRD AND FOURTH QUARTER 2010 (2011), available at 
https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/document/MAAWG_2010_Q3Q4_Metrics
_Report_14.pdf) [https://perma.cc/5SRQ-BTZA]. 
 116. Id. at 100. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See William B. Baker, The Complications of Doing Mobile Marketing Legally, J. 
INTERNET L., Feb. 2014, at 13, 13 (2014) (“A study for the Mobile Marketing Association 
(MMA) in 2013 estimated that mobile marketing communications expenditures will reach 
$9.2 billion by 2015.”). 
 119. Note that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has attempted to tackle 
this problem with the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. For a detailed discussion, see 
generally infra Part II.D.1. 
 120. Fraudulent misrepresentation includes, but is not limited to, “bait-and-switch 
advertisement” and  “deceptive advertisement.” 
 121. Hebe R. Smythe, Note, Fighting Telemarketing Scams, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 347, 365–69 (1994) (common victims are consumers, legitimate telemarketers, credit card 
companies, and lenders). 
 122. See, e.g., id. at 369–76 (discussing current prosecution mechanisms, including their 
limitations). 
 123. Id. at 363. 
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Most people do not want to be disturbed by advertisements, spam, or scams.124 
Interestingly, advertisements and spam are mostly unregulated,125 yet scams are 
protected against by fraud laws126—consumers can go after scammers but not 
advertisers or spammers. But scams result in monetary and time loss, whereas 
advertisements and spam result in time loss, at the very least—spam imposes costs 
tied to the extent of the distraction that it causes. Money and time are both forms of 
currency.127 
The degree of intrusiveness of advertisement and spam varies depending on its 
platform, whereas more time or monetary loss means more intrusiveness and vice 
versa. For example, listing from the least to the most intrusive, there are billboard 
ads, junk mail, e-mail-based ads, cell phone texts, and phone calls.128 
Our attention would really be in danger the day technology enables marketing 
companies to tell whether consumers view their ads (e.g., whether a viewer is 
watching a television advertisement). When marketing companies know we are not 
paying attention, they can come up with new ways to demand our attention. For 
example, they can pause their television ads with a warning sign to resume viewing 
the ads—if consumers do not comply or are not paying attention, such ads could 
remain paused rather than played until skipped. 
The contrast between normal daily advertisements or spam versus fraudulent 
advertisements or spam begs the question of whether an individual should be entitled 
to initiate a legal action against the advertisement and spam companies for his or her 
economic losses. 
2. Healthcare: Mandatory Ultrasound 
The doctor in Stuart v. Camnitz testified, “‘forcing this experience on a patient 
over her objections’ in this manner interferes with the decision of a patient not to 
receive information that could make an indescribably difficult decision even more 
traumatic and could ‘actually cause harm to the patient.’”129 At the very least, 
physicians should owe an ethical obligation to honor their patients’ wishes,130 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. See, e.g., John Reed Stark & Carolyn E. Kurr, Using the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Statutory Weaponry To Combat Spam, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 271, 271 (2006) (“I 
do not want your worthless spam.” (quoting Spam I Am, STRANGECOSMOS.COM, 
http://strangecosmos.com/content/item/102649.html [https://perma.cc/MV4T-TXHS] (last 
updated 2016)). 
 125. But see Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012). 
 126. See Smythe, supra note 121, at 369–76. 
 127. See supra Parts I.B.2, I.B.3. 
 128. For example, it takes longer to answer a phone call than, say, to read a billboard 
advertisement. 
 129. 774 F.3d 238, 255 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting declaration of Dr. Gretchen S. Stuart). 
 130. E.g., id. (“The information is provided irrespective of the needs or wants of the 
patient, in direct contravention of medical ethics and the principle of patient autonomy.”). 
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especially their requests to be let alone131—this is deeply rooted in the principle of 
patient autonomy.132  
Also, the physician has an ethical obligation not to “touch” the patient without the 
patient’s consent, which is what the ultrasounds really is—probing the patient for the 
fetus’s information. The right not to be touched is separate from the right to abortion. 
Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Stuart from typical “undue burden”133 
cases because the Court analyzed North Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound law under 
the First Amendment.134 Had the Fourth Circuit analyzed Stuart according to the 
pregnant mother’s rights, the “undue burden” standard would have and should have 
come up. 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the mandatory ultrasound ruling applies 
only because the state is involved or because it is rooted in physicians’ ethical 
obligations generally.135 The Fourth Circuit brought up physicians’ therapeutic 
privilege, which “permits physicians to decline or at least wait to convey relevant 
information as part of informed consent because in their professional judgment 
delivering the information to the patient at a particular time would result in serious 
psychological or physical harm.”136 The Fourth Circuit then concluded that North 
Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound law, without a therapeutic-privilege exception, 
interfered with physician’s professional judgment and ethical obligations.137 
Imagine being in the 1970s, when people first heard about the concept of the right 
to abortion.138 Most would likely say, “what is that?” and disregard it as nonsense. 
Imagine that the Supreme Court analyzed Roe v. Wade139 differently (e.g., under the 
physician’s constitutional right140—to perform or not perform an abortion—instead 
of under the pregnant woman’s right). Then, more than fifty years later, without Roe 
v. Wade decided as it was, we still might not have the right to abortion or the progress 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. “The right to be let alone” is a right under the right to privacy’s bundle of rights. See 
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 195. 
 132. For a discussion on the principle of patient autonomy, see generally Mary Anne 
Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 291, 330–74 (1994). 
 133. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–79 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
 134. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 249 & n.4. 
 135. For a general description of doctors’ ethical obligations in the abortion context, see 
generally Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s 
Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 469–78 (2000). 
 136. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 254. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending the right of privacy to include a 
woman’s right to have an abortion). 
 139. Id.  
 140. There may be room to argue that the Court decided the case on these grounds. Writing 
for the majority, Justice Blackmun explicitly held that the right “is not unqualified.” Id. at 154. 
More significantly, the Court held, “For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first 
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the 
pregnant woman’s attending physician.” Id. at 164. 
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of the feminism movement.141 There could be a similar story for the right to attention 
in Stuart.142 Stuart presented an interesting issue and opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to recognize the right to attention for pregnant women—an opportunity the 
Court refused when it denied certiorari. 
When a pregnant woman actively averted her eyes and refused to hear,143 she 
chose to not pay attention to the information from the mandatory ultrasound. The 
ultrasound would be pointless and useless because the underlying reason of 
displaying a sonogram and describing the fetus to the mother is for her to make an 
informed decision. But her objection (e.g., her acts of averting her eyes and refusing 
to hear) flies in the face of the legislature’s objective behind North Carolina’s new 
law—to assure the mother’s decision to have an abortion is deliberate and 
well-informed, or to dissuade the mother through an attempt to spur creation of an 
emotional bond with the fetus.144 Ironically, most women who pay attention to the 
ultrasound report being relieved to see the fetus because, in most cases, it is very 
early in the pregnancy and the fetus does not look like a child at this stage, reinforcing 
the women’s decisions to abort.145 
North Carolina justified its mandatory ultrasounds based on the idea that the fetus 
information is relevant to the mother’s decision making.146 Sure, a patient has the 
right to know147 about the fetus she is about to abort, information that the physicians 
would be happy to provide. But what about when the patient does not want to know? 
Forcing such images of her soon-to-be-aborted fetus into her head is quite something 
else—it might have an opposite effect: rather than being fully informed to make a 
decision about abortion, the mother might be traumatized after the abortion for 
having seen her fetus’s images when she did not want to know such information. 
A patient arguably has the right not to know148 information about her fetus when 
she does not want to. If the state argues that it is providing information relevant to 
the decision—as opposed to the information that serves the supposed state interest in 
preserving the life of the fetus—then it raises the question of why the patient can 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. Note that the feminism movement preceded the right to abortion era, but the Roe v. 
Wade decision helped the feminism movement move forward. 
 142. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 255–56. 
 143. Id. at 242. 
 144. See generally Paul Stam, Woman’s Right to Know Act: A Legislative History, 28 
ISSUES L. & MED. 3 (2012). 
 145. Cf. One Week Later, Women Denied an Abortion Feel More Regret and Less Relief 
than Those Who Have One, GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org
/media/nr/2013/08/05/index.html [https://perma.cc/775Y-9DZN] (discussing that 90 percent 
of women who were able to obtain an abortion reported that they were relieved afterward). 
 146. See Stam, supra note 144, at 36 (“‘[I]f the woman is denied information such as the 
opportunity for an ultrasound and the information relevant to her decision such as provided 
for in this [mandatory ultrasound] bill, she stands little chance of being able to make a fully 
informed choice.’” (quoting testimony of Monsignor David Brockman)). 
 147. See Woman’s Right to Know Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 90-21.80 to -21.92 (West 
Supp. 2014). 
 148. Cf. Gert Helgesson, Autonomy, the Right Not To Know, and the Right To Know 
Personal Research Results: What Rights Are There, and Who Should Decide About 
Exceptions?, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 28, 28 (2014) (describing the right not to know in 
research). 
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reject relevant information. The core of this question relies on how an individual 
reaches decisions. If information presented in particular ways (e.g., mandatory 
ultrasounds) affects the person in a way that changes her mind (e.g., creates an 
indelible image in her mind that triggers emotions that permanently affect her), then 
the information coupled with attention is arguably a factor in making the person who 
she is. This deep notion of autonomy—the right to construct the person that you are 
through control, where possible, is one of the factors that affects personal growth. In 
Wisconsin v. Yoder,149 a case about compulsory school attendance, the Supreme 
Court respected a similar kind of right. Under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment, Amish parents claimed the right to control the factors that would make 
their children who they would become as adults.150 In short, the patient’s right not to 
know falls within her bundle of attention rights—the right not to know151 and the 
right to look away.152 
II. RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT TO ATTENTION 
A. When the Right to Attention Arises 
At one time, a person engaged with others outside of the household only by 
intentionally leaving home. Even then, the individual ordinarily interacted with a 
bounded universe of others when he or she attended school, entered a store, etc. The 
universe expanded only if he or she entered a public square (e.g., a town center, 
shopping area, public street, etc.). Today, even if we live alone and do not leave our 
homes, we are bombarded with unwanted messages through unsolicited phone calls 
and on the Internet, through pop-ups, spam, and other actions that are hard to ignore. 
These intrusions, which demand attention and are designed to be difficult to ignore, 
impose costs on individuals and invade what can be thought of as personal spaces 
that should be subject to personal control. 
Technology has changed so that today we are constantly and often involuntarily 
bombarded with demands on our attention,153 and the form the demands take—vivid 
images, constant interruptions of online experiences, etc.—have become harder to 
ignore. This bombardment has made attention more valuable: advertisers will 
certainly pay for the ability to command attention.154 The change in technology has 
made the right to attention both integral to and distinct from the right to privacy. The 
right to be free from unwanted demands on our attention is necessary to allow 
individuals to assemble what they see as the relevant inputs in constituting their lives, 
in reaching appropriate decisions, and in achieving a measure of happiness. At the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 150. See id. at 221–22. 
 151. See, e.g., Helgesson, supra note 148, at 28 (describing the right not to know as the 
“right to be ignorant by having forgotten”). 
 152. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 153. E.g., Johnson, supra note 30 (stating that “we’ve gone from being exposed to about 
500 ads a day back in the 1970's to as many as 5,000 a day [in 2006],” and that number is still 
climbing). 
 154. For a discussion of the potential for attention markets, see Goldman, supra note 50, 
at 1194–97. 
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extreme, constant bombardment with unwanted images can result in sleep 
deprivation or even death, if distracted by the images at critical moments. Short of 
that, it interferes with the individual’s ability to create the self as a coherent whole, 
capable of reaching decisions in accordance with consideration of chosen values and 
factors that reflect such values. 
The law recognizes a number of concepts that give the individual the right to 
control unwanted intrusions into personal “spaces.” These include (1) property 
concepts such as trespass and nuisance,155 (2) privacy concepts that create zones of 
autonomy and freedom from intrusions,156 and (3) rights to personality that give an 
individual the ability to control certain aspects of personhood or personal freedom 
such as the use of one’s name, likeness, reputation, etc.157 The law ought to respond 
to the increased external demands for attention though recognizing a right to be free 
from intrusion if one chooses or to allocate attention in particular ways.158 
The idea of a right to privacy, which is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, 
arose during a period of urbanization in which the intrusions of daily life on personal 
zones of residence and behavior were increasing.159 Today, new technology 
intensifies the assaults on our personal zones of existence not through physical 
proximity, but through more subtle intrusions that either compete with each other for 
notice (e.g., pop-up ads160) or take the form of commands that we prioritize particular 
messages (e.g., mandatory ultrasounds161) over others we might choose.  
The idea of a right to attention is a necessary counterpoint to these technological 
changes that take the form of demands for our attention.162 It addresses the imbalance 
between companies’ ability to use technology to command greater portions of our 
attention for profit and our inability to avoid those commands. It thus aids the “little 
guy” who may not otherwise be able to fight back. It also preserves for the individual 
the freedom to assemble the inputs that allow the construction of a coherent self 
capable of making appropriate decisions on the basis of chosen, rather than imposed, 
values.163 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “The country needs and, unless I mistake its 
temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take 
a method and try it: If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try 
something.”164 He further explained, “The millions who are in want will not stand by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 155. See, e.g., Page Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance, and Strict Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 
457 (1959). 
 156. See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 195. 
 157. See Sara R. Benson, Hacking the Gender Binary Myth: Recognizing Fundamental 
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 160. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 161. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 162. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 163. See Benson, supra note 157, at 50–55 (proposing recognition of the fundamental right 
to personality). 
 164. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President, The Country Needs, the Country Demands 
Bold, Persistent Experimentation, Address at Oglethorpe University (May 22, 1932), in 1 THE 
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silently forever while the things to satisfy their needs are within easy reach.”165 Following 
this line of thought, we will not have a right to attention unless we demand it. 
1. Why? Justifications for the Right to Attention 
a. Attention Has Value, and Its Value Is Increasing166 
Attention is a form of currency,167 and, like time, we only have a limited amount 
of it.168 Attention can be converted to money.169 One commentator has already 
speculated that in the future, our attention will be sold.170 Not only does our attention 
have value, but its value is increasing with increasing demands for our attention.171 
Therefore, we deserve the recognition of our right to attention.172 
Our right to attention is similar to the right to our time173 or the right to our 
money.174 Anyone in their right mind would most likely not allow others to take their 
time or money freely, in fact, they would probably at least charge some handsome 
money for their time. Similarly, others should not be able to take our attention freely. 
In fact, it is rather unethical to abridge others’ attention without compensating them 
in some way or another. We should be able to take back our attention, which was 
rightfully ours in the first place. 
We live in a world where advertisement and social media175 populate the 
Internet.176 The Internet is everywhere, and everything is happening on the Internet. 
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 166. See supra Part I.B. 
 167. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 168. Of course, pharmaceutical supplements (e.g., Adderall) can enhance an individual’s 
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 169. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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 171. See supra Part I.B. 
 172. See supra Part II.A. 
 173. The right to our time means the right to the ownership of our time—to spend it 
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and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927, 1976 (2000) (discussing the right to relief in the 
context of an action for lost wages). 
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platform. See, e.g., THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010). 
 176. See, e.g., Colin M. Leonard & Tyler T. Hendry, From Peoria to Peru: NLRB Doctrine 
in A Social Media World, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 199, 201–03 (2013) (discussing the 
proliferation of social media in the labor context); supra text accompanying note 30. 
1044 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 91:1023 
 
We use the Internet every day. If the law does not recognize our right to attention, 
we may become so easily distracted with all of the advertisements that we might 
never get anything done. Now is the perfect time to recognize the right to attention. 
Otherwise, law will again move slower than technology.177 
b. Attention as a Utilitarian Right 
Attention belongs to each individual. Attention is valuable, and its value is 
increasing.178 Each individual has certain rights and freedoms. The right to attention 
is like the right to sleep.179 Does an individual have a right to sleep because it is 
valuable to him or her alone?180 Indeed, an individual has a “right” to have a dog181 
or to play music.182 Does he or she have a right to say that a neighbor’s dog cannot 
bark in the yard at 4 a.m.? Is this different from the question of whether the 
government can use sleep deprivation as a means of interrogation? The argument that 
attention is valuable is like the idea of freedom. Right-wing people could assert the 
claim to freedom in the name of discriminating against others or skewing the political 
system to advance their own ends. Their “freedom” comes at the expense of the 
freedom of others. This is the Hohfeldian idea183: assertion of a property right is not 
absolute; it occurs in the context of personal relationships.184 
Property law is, to an extent, based on the notion of Hohfeldian assignment of 
rights. It complements the bundle of rights idea.185 One of the notions is that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 177. Cf. Jasper L. Tran, Press Clause and 3D Printing, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
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 185. See, e.g., Gormley, supra note 159, at 1335 (discussing components of the right to 
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assertion of a property right against someone else limits their freedom and vice 
versa.186 The question of how best to enforce rights then follows from seeing the 
rights in terms of personal relationships rather than relationships between properties. 
According to the Hohfeldian construct, a right to attention would not be created until 
there has been an infringement of that right;187 for example, an advertisement seeking 
our attention. But this is a scenario that would almost always be true given the 
amount of ads we receive per day. 
The Coase theorem deals with this, too.188 Under the Coase theorem, consider 
whether the individual should have to pay for a right to be free from intrusion (e.g., 
whether there should be a market for distraction-free electronic products) or 
whether the advertiser should have to pay for the right to intrude.189 Our current 
model is that to have access to an ad-free version of an iPhone app, one has to pay 
a nominal fee like $5 or $10 per app. This could eventually get too costly and is 
not an option for everyone, which creates a distinction based on wealth or 
socioeconomic class.190 Because this Article focuses on the “little guy,” it assumes 
that most customers—ones with not much money for extra expenses—would likely 
not pay for an ad-free version and would instead put up with the ads. 
Furthermore, the debate on the right to attention mirrors the classic exchange 
between University of Texas Law Professor John Robertson191 and University of 
California Hastings Law Professor Radhika Rao192 about the right to reproduce. 
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Robertson argued many years ago that there was an affirmative right to reproduce.193 
He argued that reproduction was valuable to the individual194 and that the line of the 
mandatory sterilization cases infringe the right to procreate.195 On the other hand, 
Rao argued against an affirmative right to reproduce but in the form of a negative 
privacy right—a right to be free from offensive government intrusions.196 What made 
the intrusions, like mandatory sterilization, offensive was a combination of the 
degree of intrusion (surgery or other physical invasions of the body are definitely 
intrusive) and extent of impact (here, deprivation of the ability to reproduce affects 
a substantial life activity).197 Rao thus claimed, in effect, that the real constitutional 
interest was the privacy one; the right to be free from certain kinds of interventions 
and that any “right to reproduce” was derivative.198 Given that Rao had the better 
read of the Supreme Court cases,199 the right to attention is a negative right under the 
right to privacy’s umbrella of rights. 
c. Attention as Individual Dignity 
Under the Kantian approach,200 an individual’s ability to control that to which he 
pays attention is an important component of his ability to determine who he can 
become as a person, the type of life he wishes to lead, and his meaningful consent 
(or lack thereof) to individual transactions.201 Wholesale deprivation of the ability to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 193. See Robertson, supra note 191. 
 194. See id. at 338–39. 
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METAPHYSIC OF MORALS § 75 (H.J. Paton trans. 1948), in H.J. PATON, THE MORAL LAW 95 
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 201. See sources cited supra note 200. 
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control attention is torture; thus, government interrogators often use sleep 
deprivation or bombard suspects with unwanted distractions, such as loud music,202 
to make it hard for the suspects to focus attention in ways that allow them to resist 
interrogators. These acts, which involve both the deprivation of the ability to direct 
attention and the forced direction of attention, are torture.203 And when the 
government allows them, it violates a person’s rights in many contexts, rights that go 
to bodily integrity and freedom from coerced confessions.204 Attention is thus part of 
what we treat as a right to individual dignity (or exercise of free will in making 
choices or other formulations you may choose), called for by natural law.205 
d. Freedom of Choice 
We each have the freedom of choice206 to spend our attention however and 
whenever we want. The right to choose (also referred to as the right of choice) has 
been enumerated in many forms.207 Why not the right to attention? As argued, the 
right to attention is already a part of the privacy right’s bundle of rights.208 
Recognizing the right to attention gives the “little guys” more privacy and control 
over their lives and their daily decisions. 
Like the right to privacy, the right to attention is arguably a fundamental personal 
right.209 Justice Brandeis articulated, “The makers of our Constitution undertook to 
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They knew that only a 
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material 
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things.”210 Attention is a resource that can lead to an individual’s happiness, whereas 
distraction is rarely welcomed. The freedom of choice to spend one’s attention must 
be respected and protected to the utmost. 
2. What? To Recognize the Right to Attention 
We own and are entitled to our attention, yet advertisement companies and scam 
artists freely bombard us with their “products” daily, resulting in our own time and 
monetary loss.211 If the right to attention is not recognized, states could continue to 
freely mandate ultrasounds for pregnant women against their will, as if their attention 
were not really theirs in the first place.212 Similarly, other problems in our daily lives 
that involve attention would likely continue to go unaddressed. New, emerging 
technologies make this an issue of increasing importance. 
Given the situation, this Article proposes legislation to recognize the right to 
attention213 as a statutory right214 or, alternatively, suggests that the courts recognize 
the right to attention as a constitutional right. Specifically, the right to attention’s 
much larger, as-yet-poorly-defined bundle of rights215 includes, for example, the 
right to deny attention when demanded, the right to be left alone,216 the right not to 
be spammed217 and the right not to receive ads when such advertisement is unwanted 
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or uninvited,218 the right to waive the understanding of an agreement, the right to 
give consent without being informed,219 and the right not to be required to receive 
information against one’s will. 
The right to attention would primarily be a negative right rather than a positive 
right.220 This means the government has no affirmative duty to ensure an individual’s 
right to attention (i.e., not a positive right), but each individual has the right not to 
have his or her attention demanded or taken away freely without consequences (i.e., 
a negative right). 
Furthermore, given that the right to attention is a personal right, it would attach to 
each individual and, thus, would not be transferable.221 Also, the right to attention 
would only apply to persons and not corporations because entities like corporations 
do not have attention.222 
The legislature should allow an individual to have a legal action against 
advertisement and spam companies for taking away his or her time and attention.223 
By asserting the injury of lost time and attention, a litigant could convert the lost time 
and attention to the other form of currency (i.e., money) via the remedy of monetary 
damages.224 This takes care of the injury and remedy issues. Enactment of this 
proposal would give each individual the necessary standing to initiate a legal action 
against advertisement corporations, empowering them to stand up for themselves to 
take back what is rightfully theirs in the first place—their attention. 
Recognizing the right to attention would also allow individuals to not be subject 
to needless, mandatory ultrasounds against their wills.225 Recognizing the right to 
attention would help form contracts226 or a more informed consent.227 Without 
recognizing the right to attention, contract formation and informed consent are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 218. See id. 
 219. See Vadim S. Rotenberg, To Inform or Not To Inform—A Decision with 
Psychobiological Implication, 16 MED. & L. 49, 52 (1997) (“[T]he patient with a ‘fatal’ illness 
has the right not to be informed about his illness in order to be free from renunciation of search 
and helplessness.”). 
 220. See supra Part II.A.1.b. This is similar to the right to abortion, where a pregnant 
mother is entitled to have an abortion, but the government does not need to provide funds or 
access to such abortion (except when it is necessary to save the pregnant mother’s life). See 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980). 
 221. In New York, for example, the right of publicity is a privacy claim that is personal to 
an individual, is non-transferable, and is extinguished upon the individual’s death. See Smith 
v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 499 N.Y.S.2d 167, 168 (App. Div. 1986). This is 
similar to the right to privacy. 
 222. Cf., e.g., Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp., 195 Cal. Rptr. 393, 411 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(“[C]orporations have a lesser right to privacy than human beings and are not entitled to claim 
a right to privacy in terms of a fundamental right . . . .”). Furthermore, corporations are fictional 
entities that do not have the five human senses, which is where the ability to pay attention 
comes from. 
 223. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 224. See supra Parts I.B.2 & I.B.3. 
 225. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 226. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 227. See infra Part II.C.1. 
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hollow and superfluous228: contracting parties have no meeting of the minds229 and 
informed consent is giving consent without being informed.230 In short, recognizing 
the right to attention would give the “little guys” more privacy and control over their 
lives and their daily decisions. 
To infringe on an individual’s right to attention, the government would probably 
be subject to some level of intermediate-scrutiny review,231 rather than 
rational-basis232 or strict-scrutiny review.233 It is too easy to satisfy rational basis, 
which would make the right to attention superfluous. Similarly, strict-scrutiny review 
for the right to attention (unlike, for example, the right to vote) is likely too high of 
a standard. 
Note that a requirement to read a written contract is easier for an individual to 
ignore than a requirement to watch a video or to listen to audio. Thus, insistence on 
delivering information that is harder to ignore (e.g., by requiring watching a video or 
listening to audio) as a condition for, for example, buying an audio recording or 
consenting to in vitro fertilization (IVF)234 should be more offensive than imposing 
an easier requirement (e.g., requiring reading a written contract). The contexts seem 
different: buying a recording is usually about copyright, whereas IVF has risks which 
may impact the mother or the child. Individuals can voluntarily waive their right to 
attention, but others intruding on their right to attention should not assume waiver of 
that right. Note that this only applies when individuals are forced to give up their 
right. A notice to individuals inquiring or requesting a waiver of their right to 
attention would be a start and should be enforceable. In other words, giving up the 
right to attention cannot be a condition (i.e., waiver of the right to attention cannot 
be forced), but individuals can voluntarily waive their right to attention. For example, 
either access to a contract or to an abortion can be conditioned on the waiver of the 
right to attention. 
3. How? Where the Right to Attention Can Come From 
One scholar examined 100 years of the right to privacy and concluded that 
scholars were “unable to agree on a one-size-fits-all definition of legal privacy 
                                                                                                                 
 
 228. See infra Part II.C. 
 229. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 230. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 231. The intermediate-scrutiny review discussed here follows the same intermediate 
scrutiny under the constitutional standard of review for an equal protection claim. That is, the 
government must prove that the regulation is substantially related to an important government 
interest. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225 (1995). 
 232. Under the rational-basis standard of review for an equal protection claim, the 
regulation’s challenger must prove that the regulation is not rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 233. Under the strict-scrutiny standard of review for an equal protection claim, the 
government must prove that the regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling government 
interest. E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984). 
 234. For a discussion on IVF, see generally June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Embryo 
Fundamentalism, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1015 (2010); June Carbone, Who Decides 
What Number of Children Is “Right”?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 109 (2009). 
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because it actually consists of five distinct species”: (1) tort privacy, (2) Fourth 
Amendment privacy, (3) First Amendment privacy, (4) fundamental-decision 
privacy, and (5) state constitutional privacy.235 Similarly, the right to attention can 
come from many different places as well: (1) the right to privacy under the U.S. 
Constitution, (2) statutes, (3) economic/property rights, or (4) human rights. 
Upon reviewing the literature, the right to attention has appeared before in only 
one context: minors’ right to attention from their parents.236 There is no reason why 
this should not be extended to be an individual’s right. The Supreme Court could 
start here—minors’ right to attention from their parents—and expand it to all 
individuals. 
The right to attention can stem from other existing rights. For instance, 
constitutionally, the right to attention237 can be interpreted as part of the “right to 
privacy[’s]”238 “bundle of rights”239 as guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments240 and their penumbrae.241 Specifically, the 
penumbrae and Ninth Amendment contain many unenumerated rights,242 one of 
which could include the right to attention. Alternatively, rather than falling under the 
right to privacy’s umbrella of rights, the Supreme Court could read the right to 
attention from the Constitution’s First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments and their penumbrae. Constitutional law itself is a romantic subject.243 
                                                                                                                 
 
 235. Gormley, supra note 159, at 1335 (discussing 100 years of the right to privacy). 
 236. Note that the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has advocated for “children 
hav[ing] the right to attention from both parents.” UNICEF, Article 18, YOUTUBE (Sept. 28, 2007), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m3wTJ30FaCQ&list=PLtPoovv4KdsIxNzFBQoYJhRiz6nm
1oZ2v&index=16 [https://perma.cc/7Q8H-G42X]. For a discussion on UNICEF, see generally 
About UNICEF, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/about/who/index_introduction.html (last 
updated May 12, 2015). Although the United Nations’ concept is different from the concept 
articulated in this Article, why shouldn’t the United States extend a similar-but-unqualified 
right to attention to each individual, including adults? 
 237. The right to attention is a right viewed from the information receiver’s perspective. 
This leads to some overlap between the right to attention and the right to privacy. If we draw 
a Venn diagram between the two rights’ bundle of rights, there are some overlaps and some 
differences. The right to attention is a framework, a perspective. Rather than trying to fit this 
nicely within our current body of law, this Article offers a fresh perspective to view law from 
the angle of “attention.” This was how the body of privacy law got started—looking at law 
from the perspective of “privacy.” 
 238. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15. This was the first article that articulated the right 
to privacy. 
 239. E.g., Steven Winters, Comment, The New Privacy Interest: Electronic Mail in the 
Workplace, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 197, 200 (1993) (describing the right to privacy as “a diverse 
and growing bundle of rights which derive from four principal sources: The United States 
Constitution, state constitutions, statutory sources, and the common law” (footnotes omitted)). 
 240. See cases cited supra note 16. 
 241. The penumbrae include the rights guaranteed by implication in the Constitution. See 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–86 (1965); Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan 
Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1997). 
 242. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” (emphasis added)). 
 243. Cf. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 1641, 1641 (1967) (“Our constitutional theory is in the grip of a romantic conception 
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What we knew about constitutional law twenty years ago is different from what we 
know today, which will again be different from what we know twenty years from 
now. 
Statutorily, the right to attention can be interpreted as a negative right from, for 
example, the right to not be disturbed by others’ loud noises244 (for which one could 
call the police to file a noise245 complaint against loud neighbors246) or by noise from 
a vehicle.247 
Alternatively, the right to attention can be recognized as an economic or property 
right, falling under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guaranty of “life, liberty, [and] 
property.”248 The right to attention can also be a tort right, for which there could be 
a damages remedy.249 The right to attention could also be a human right.250 
B. When the Right to Attention Does Not Arise 
The right to attention is not absolute—it should have boundaries. The right to 
attention generally would not arise if an individual were under an obligation251 or 
were to gain a privilege.252 Although it is hard to tell whether an individual is paying 
attention, his or her attention can be demanded through, for example, the 
administration of an exam.253 Even so, the demanding party would still need a 
                                                                                                                 
 
of free expression, a belief that the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is freely accessible.”). 
 244. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 342F-30.5 (West 2008) (“[n]oise control” statute 
providing for creation of state community noise code). 
 245. Noise can be subject to time, place, and manner restrictions. See State v. Poe, 88 P.3d 
704, 7113 (Idaho 2004) (“[R]easonable time, place, or manner restrictions on speech may be 
upheld if they are justified without reference to the content of the speech, and speech may be 
proscribed based upon a non-content element, such as noise.” (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377 (1992))). 
 246. Of course, some noise level, such as from a “licensed premises” under Washington 
D.C.’s laws, can be permitted depending on a property’s zoning district. See, e.g., D.C. CODE 
§ 25-725 (LexisNexis Supp. 2015) (“[n]oise from licensed premises” statute). Also, loud 
noises from living or being near aircraft or trains are also permitted because people assume 
the risk when living near an airport or the railroad. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 4916 (2012) (setting 
“[r]ailroad noise emission standards” that imply that noises near a railroad are permitted on 
some level and implying that those who choose to live near a railroad assume the risk of 
disturbance caused by noises). 
 247. See Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901–18 (2012) (commanding emission 
standards for manufacturers of noise emitters). 
 248. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 249. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 219 (describing the remedies for 
invasion of privacy as grounded in tort). 
 250. See generally supra Part II.A.1.c. 
 251. North Carolina’s mandatory ultrasound requirement is not an obligation to pregnant 
women because the new law interferes with a pregnant woman’s right to abort. See Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 252. The quid pro quo for demanding an individual’s attention is receiving a privilege in 
exchange. 
 253. Assuming he or she wants to pass, of course. Without paying attention, one would not 
likely pass an exam. 
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legitimate interest to override an individual’s right to attention and require his or her 
attention for a finite amount of time. For example,254 to gain the driving privilege, an 
individual must pass both the written and driving exams, where he or she must pay 
extra careful attention either while taking the written exam or while driving during 
the driving exam. The government can justify its requirement of an individual’s 
attention because driving a vehicle is like operating a dangerous or deadly weapon 
that can easily kill others.255 
Clients, customers, and bosses can demand employees’ attention according to 
contractual agreement. Under their contractual obligations, employees often must 
pay attention to clients, customers, and bosses during the work hours as part of the 
job’s requirements. Technically, an employee can choose to not pay attention on the 
job, but failure to do so might result in being fired. 
Also, the government can demand an individual’s attention, and the individual 
can face consequences for not complying.256 For instance, jury duty calls an 
individual to serve on a jury, presumably paying attention to the facts at trial to vote 
on a verdict. Failure to report for jury duty may result in a fine,257 but a juror faces 
no consequence for not paying attention and falling asleep during trial.258 Courts can 
summon an individual as a witness via their power to subpoena, and an individual 
can face court sanctions resulting in fines or jail time for failure to appear.259 Failure 
to respond to a court’s questions during a hearing can result in sanctions or being 
disciplined. Similarly, a police officer can arrest or detain an individual with 
sufficient probable cause.260 
Another exception to the right to attention is that there is no right to attention in a 
human relationship.261 Attention is the premise of each human relationship; humans 
naturally crave attention and want others’ validation.262 For instance, when a spouse 
                                                                                                                 
 
 254. The listed scenarios are not exhaustive. Rather, they serve as a starting place to think 
about similar instances. 
 255. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 597 F. Supp. 2d 155, 157 (D. Me. 2009) 
(“Maine law confirms that the act of driving a motor vehicle into another vehicle can constitute 
use of a dangerous weapon.” (citing State v. York, 899 A.2d 780, 781–82 (Me. 2006))). 
 256. This overlaps with other schemes in society: our duty as members of a society and our 
obligations to follow the law to belong to society. 
 257. E.g., Imperial – Ignoring Jury Duty May Result in Fines, LSI (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://www.lsi.org/imperial-ignoring-jury-duty-may-result-in-fines/ [https://perma.cc/TBR8
-N6DV]. 
 258. Cf. People v. Williams, 355 P.3d 444, 470 (Cal. 2015) (holding that “sleeping during 
trial constitutes good cause for the dismissal of juror” and implicitly holding that jurors face 
no consequences—besides being dismissed—for falling asleep). 
 259. E.g., State v. Castle, 637 N.E.2d 80, 82 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (affirming criminal 
contempt for failure to obey subpoenas requiring witness testimony). 
 260. E.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630 (2003) (per curiam) (“[T]he traditional rule 
[is] that arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause.” (quoting Hayes v. 
Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985))). 
 261. The human relationship is a personal relationship rather than a commercial one like 
in the case of advertisement, spam, and scams. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 262. See, e.g., Arthur Pearlstein, Pursuit of Happiness and Resolution of Conflict: An 
Agenda for the Future of ADR, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 215, 250 (2012) (“[D]esire for 
attention or approval . . . ‘[was] implanted . . . within our natures as a substitute for reason or 
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stops paying attention to the other partner, the relationship is likely doomed to fail.263 
Although a spouse might arguably have the right to attention from the other partner 
for dating or marrying that partner, this Article does not advocate for recognizing the 
right to attention in domestic disputes, which are personal and can be solved between 
the parties. Likewise, this Article does not discuss whether children have a right to 
attention from their parents.264 
C. Application to Other Contexts 
Every exchange of information involves at least two parties, where one side 
communicates the information and the other side receives the information. 
Scholarship most often focuses on the communicator’s perspective (e.g., how much 
information the communicator discloses) or on the information itself,265 but 
surprisingly, scholarship does not focus much on the receiver’s perspective. 
This lack of discussion and dearth of scholarship from the information receiver’s 
perspective is problematic because the receiver is often the “little guy”266 in the 
conversation. For those who do not pay attention in reviewing contracts, contracting 
parties have no meeting of the minds,267 and “informed consent” could mean giving 
consent without being informed.268 Recognizing the right to attention would 
legitimize informed consent and contract formation by allowing individuals to waive 
their rights to attention.269 
1. Healthcare: Informed Consent 
Attention is very important to the decision-making process and is especially 
crucial in the healthcare decision-making setting. In healthcare, there are usually two 
parties in each conversation270: physicians as the communicator and patients as the 
information receiver. If the receiver does not pay attention, the communication chain 
is broken. Interesting cases arise in the informed-consent regime. 
                                                                                                                 
 
virtue.’” (quoting Douglas W. Kmiec, The Human Nature of Freedom and Identity—We Hold 
More than Random Thoughts, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 33, 47 (2005))); id. (“‘[A]ttention 
addresses a fundamental human desire. . . . While many of us crave huge amounts of 
recognition, the lure is not merely fame or a place in history. It’s also praise from the people 
around you for what you do.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Goldhaber, supra note 60)). 
 263. See, e.g., Leslie Petruk, Divorce Signs: 6 Indications that Your Marriage Will End, 
HUFFPOST: DIVORCE (Oct. 29, 2012, 12:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012
/10/29/divorce-signs_n_2025734.html [https://perma.cc/R2DT-E593] (“Just like other 
relationships, if your marriage doesn’t receive the necessary time and attention, it will 
deteriorate.”). 
 264. See supra note 236. 
 265. See supra note 27. 
 266. The “little guy” denotes one without authority and whose voice is not being heard. 
 267. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 268. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 269. See infra Parts II.C.1 & II.C.2. 
 270. The other parties are the hospital and the insurance company, but they are not relevant 
to the context at hand—the communication between a patient and his or her physician. 
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New York codified the existing common law informed-consent doctrine into the 
Medical Malpractice Act, defining the lack of “informed consent” as:  
the failure of the person providing the professional treatment or diagnosis 
to disclose to the patient such alternatives thereto and the reasonably 
foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical, dental 
or podiatric practitioner under similar circumstances would have 
disclosed, in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable 
evaluation.271  
In short, a physician owes a duty to inform or disclose when the physician takes an 
action in cases involving “‘non-emergency treatment, procedure or surgery’ or 
procedures that involve ‘invasion or disruption of the integrity of the body.’”272 
In recent years, controversies regarding informed consent have been on the rise, 
with questions raised over whether and to what extent physicians must disclose 
health risks to patients273 and whether and to what extent researchers must disclose 
their research findings to participants.274 However, these informed-consent questions 
focused solely on the perspective of the physicians, the researchers, or their affiliated 
institutions, but not the patients. The underlying assumption is that patients pay 
attention and understand most, if not all, information from the physicians and the 
researchers. 
Can a patient, either intentionally or inadvertently, just not listen, not understand, 
or not pay attention to the information coming from physicians or researchers? For 
example, the physicians or researchers could speak in medical or scientific language 
that the patient does not understand, and thus the patient might not pay attention to 
the disclosed information. Or a patient who does not speak English and requires a 
translator may not understand the physician’s words through the translator because 
the words’ meanings were lost in the translation. Or a patient could simply choose to 
not pay attention to the information disclosed. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 271. Paula Walter, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: To Inform or Not To Inform?, 71 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 543, 549 (1997) (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1) 
(McKinney 1993)). 
 272. Id. at 551 (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(2) (McKinney 1993)). 
 273. See, e.g., Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease 
Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 350–92 (1974); James A. Henderson, Jr. & 
Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure To 
Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 271–326 (1990) (discussing physicians’ failure to warn); 
Valerie Gutmann Koch, A Private Right of Action for Informed Consent in Research, 45 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 173, 177–83 (2015) (discussing informed consent to treatment); Peter H. 
Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 907–41 (1994); Marjorie Maguire 
Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 
219, 232–56 (1985) (discussing physicians’ duty to inform).  
 274. See, e.g., Capron, supra note 273, at 350–92; Koch, supra note 273, at 183–93 
(discussing informed consent in research); Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in 
Human Subject Experimentation, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 165–96 (1998); Preston D. Mitchum, 
Note, Gene Patents and Informed Consent: The Mythical “Reasonable Person” Standard, 3 
BIOTECHNOLOGY & PHARMACEUTICAL L. REV. 79, 79–86 (2010).  
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How about when a patient does not get the relevant information not by choice but 
rather due to a systemic problem? The critical question is what physicians should tell 
patients, and lawyers would often advise physicians to tell patients everything—every 
possible scenario, no matter how unlikely. However, “Many consent forms are 15 to 
20 pages long. . . . [T]o simply read a document that is 20 pages long would mean a 
time spent of approximately 60 minutes.”275 Consent forms that are lengthy and filled 
with legalese actually obscure rather than illuminate relevant information.276 Instead 
of directing patients’ attention to the relevant information to inform patients, these 
forms do the opposite—distract the patients with unhelpful information.277  
This is the negative consequence of telling patients everything. For example, a 
patient who needs a wisdom tooth removed might face an extremely rare chance of 
death,278 but does the patient need to know that? Most people think not, because 
knowing would likely deter most patients, especially millennials who are (at least in 
terms of finances) more risk averse than previous generations,279 from undergoing 
this typically safe treatment. Thus, patients would then have to deal with the 
consequences of not undergoing the procedure. Either way, the patients suffer. 
Alternatively, patients also suffer when their physicians withhold information 
either intentionally or because the physicians are used to doing things a certain 
way.280 Ultimately, what patients would want to know most is the information that 
would allow them to make better choices (e.g., this anesthesia is better than that one) 
and to know what their physician’s opinion is or which treatment their physician 
would recommend. 
Once a patient, either intentionally or inadvertently, just does not listen, does not 
understand, or does not pay attention to the information coming from physicians or 
researchers, the question becomes whether a patient was informed in giving his or 
her “informed consent.” Evidently not, and the so-called informed consent becomes 
superfluous and hollow281—it is just consent without being informed. The objective 
behind informed consent is actually evidenced by the heavy emphasis on the word 
“informed” rather than “consent,”282 though both terms are still important. Informed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 275. Anvita Pandiya, Readability and Comprehensibility of Informed Consent Forms for 
Clinical Trials, 1 PERSP. CLINICAL RES. 98, 99 (2010). 
 276. See id. 
 277. See id. 
 278. See, e.g., Maine Teenager Dies After Wisdom Teeth Removed, CBS NEWS (Feb. 27, 
2014, 4:55 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/maine-teenager-dies-after-wisdom-teeth
-removed/ [https://perma.cc/P89Y-ZDC4] (“[D]eath from complications of oral surgery is so 
rare that its frequency cannot be accurately estimated.”). 
 279. E.g., Steven Russolillo, Chart of the Day: Millennials Are Really Risk Averse, WALL 
ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (May 29, 2014, 2:37 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014
/05/29/chart-of-the-day-millennials-are-really-risk-averse/ [https://perma.cc/DQQ6-86GC].  
 280. See Mark A. Rothstein & Gil Siegal, Health Information Technology and Physicians’ 
Duty To Notify Patients of New Medical Developments, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93, 
133–34 (2012) (discussing physicians’ duty to notify and its practical concerns, including 
patients’ privacy and (in some cases) patients’ “lack of health literacy” interfering with their 
“ability to understand health information”). 
 281. This is very similar to the analysis of contract formation. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 282. Cf. Edward L. Raab, The Parameters of Informed Consent, 102 TRANSACTIONS AM. 
OPHTHALMOLOGICAL SOC’Y 225, 229 (2004) (discussing conceiving of informed consent “as 
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consent is a great idea,283 but it will not work if patients are not paying attention.284 
Recognizing the right to attention would allow the patient to waive his or her 
respective right to attention. That is, the patient would effectively waive his or her 
right to an informed consent while still giving consent.285 
Given that an individual’s attention span is limited and easily lost after reading 
pages after pages of text, the hospital should summarize the consent form in one 
paragraph in bold, separately initialed or read to the patient. These are efforts to 
command attention and thus demonstrate that consent is informed. Informed consent 
forms are becoming meaningless rituals, but with the right delivery, they can 
effectively compel attention rather than burying salient points in ways that obscure 
them. 
2. Adhesion Contract: Contract Formation 
To form a contract, the offeror offers, followed by the offeree’s acceptance.286 
There are two contracting parties. In the case of an adhesion contract, the offeror has 
the commanding power, whereas the offeree often must “take-it-or-leave-it.”287 The 
offeror (i.e., the communicator) often attempts to communicate the contract’s terms 
to the offeree (i.e., the information receiver), and the offeree attempts to listen to 
understand what he or she is getting himself or herself into.288 But what happens 
when the offeree, intentionally or inadvertently, does not pay attention in either 
listening or reading the adhesion contract’s terms? 
This scenario occurs quite often. For example, before individuals can live in an 
apartment, they must sign a rental agreement setting out the terms of the lease, 
regardless of whether they read the agreement. Before individuals can download a 
computer program (e.g., Apple’s iTunes)289 or join a website (e.g., Facebook)290 or 
find out more information about their DNA (e.g., 23andMe),291 they must click “I 
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 283. Interview with Bryan Liang, M.D., Ph.D., J.D. and Arthur W. Grayson Professor of 
Law & Medicine, Southern Illinois University Schools of Law and Medicine, 
AUDIOLOGYONLINE (May 9, 2000), http://www.audiologyonline.com/interviews/interview
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 284. See Pandiya, supra note 275, at 98. 
 285. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 286. See U.C.C. § 2-206 (2014). In forming a contract, there is also consideration and a 
meeting of the minds. See, e.g., Caroline N. Bruckel, Consideration in Exclusive and 
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Accept” to an adhesion contract provided by the company,292 regardless of whether 
they read the agreement. 
Without reading the agreement, the party with little voice—the offeree in an 
adhesion contract—effectively waives his or her rights. The American culture has 
become fixated on contracts’ written signatures or initials to protect the interests of 
landlords, software companies, and the like without paying much attention293 to the 
other contractual party—the offeree. 
A lack of attention from the offeree’s side effectively destroys the contract (or at 
least its spirit) because there is no meeting of the minds of both parties.294 Some 
might consider this agreement waiver (i.e., the offeree waiving his or her right to 
understand the contract’s terms but still wanting to go through with it) perhaps due 
to trust or simply not understanding the contract or believing that a lack of bargaining 
power makes reading the contract’s terms pointless. Regardless, what the offeree 
waived was the ability to understand the contract’s terms or, in other words, the 
offeree’s right to attention.295 Without recognizing this right to attention, a contract, 
though it looks “good” on paper, is in fact hollow and superfluous because there is 
no meeting of the minds. Recognizing the right to attention would allow the offeree 
to waive his or her respective right to still form a contract.296 
Like the suggested improvements for informed consent,297 the offeror should 
likewise summarize the contract in one paragraph in bold, separately initialed or read 
to the offeree. These are efforts to command attention and thus demonstrate that the 
contracting parties had a meeting of the minds. Adhesion contracts are also becoming 
meaningless rituals, but with the right delivery, they can effectively compel attention 
rather than burying salient points in ways that obscure them. 
D. Counterarguments to Recognizing the Right to Attention  
1. Narrowing the Communicator’s Freedom of Speech and Fitting the Right into 
Current Laws 
The strongest counterargument is that recognizing the information receiver’s right 
to attention would oppose, and, in effect, narrow the communicator’s freedom of 
speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment, including his or her right to 
advertise.298 
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However, the focus here is on the receiver, not the communicator.299 If the focus 
always stays on the communicator, the receiver would likewise always receive the 
shorter end of the stick. Just because the communicator has the freedom of speech, 
such freedom is not unlimited and is not without boundaries. In fact, the freedom 
of speech itself has boundaries and exceptions.300 It is about time for the receiver 
to speak up for his or her respective rights,301 especially the right to attention.302 
And it is time to recognize both the communicator’s and the receiver’s respective 
rights—rather than just viewing the issue from the communicator’s perspective—and 
work together to achieve a fair and reasonable resolution.303 
Furthermore, this Article is not advocating for more regulation or prohibition of 
the communicator’s speech, but rather, for a recognition of the receiver’s right to 
attention.304 Perhaps an unintended effect of recognizing the receiver’s right to 
attention could be narrowing the communicator’s speech by a time, place, and 
manner restriction.305 
Another unintended effect could be making some current law unnecessary, for 
example, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act.306 The current rule is that (1) callers must provide their names, their 
representative institution, and a contact phone number or address; (2) callers cannot 
call between 9:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m.; and (3) callers must immediately comply with 
do-not-call requests.307 However, the FCC’s attempt has fallen short of solving the 
problem: it focuses on treatment rather than prevention or cure.308 Putting a 
“Band-Aid on a bullet hole” does not solve the long-term distraction problem of 
advertisements, spam, and scams. For example, “we’ve gone from being exposed to 
about 500 ads a day back in the 1970’s to as many as 5,000 a day [in 2006],”309 and 
that number is still climbing. Imagine a future where almost everyone wears Google 
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Glass,310 but ads pop up every three to five minutes. Americans badly need a more 
long-term solution—recognizing the right to attention could be a start. 
However, our current laws are not perfect, and we should welcome innovative 
changes—changes that make sense—for example, North Carolina’s new mandatory 
ultrasound law is invalid.311 The right to privacy faced a very similar challenge 125 
years ago, until the Supreme Court recognized it as a common-law constitutional 
right. Likewise, it is time for a change for our attention, and changes in law have to 
start somewhere. Although most of the time the changes are small,312 some bold 
changes should be made—especially in this information day and age. 
Regardless, given the progression of technology making attention a more valuable 
asset,313 it is time to even the playing field and grant the information receiver some 
respective rights of his or her own. 
2. Assumption of Risk when Not Paying Attention 
Others could argue that not paying attention is a choice rather than a right, and 
those choosing to not pay attention implicitly assume the risk of doing so.314 This is 
especially relevant in the contract formation analysis, where the information receiver 
essentially assumes the risk by not paying attention to the contract’s terms.315 
This assumption of risk argument would only work in scenarios where the 
information receiver intentionally disregards the communicated information. 
However, in the situations where the receiver accidentally did not receive the 
information for one reason or another, this assumption of risk argument is not 
applicable. Even in scenarios where the receiver intentionally disregards the 
communicated information, for example, when the mother “‘avert[ed] her eyes’” and 
“‘refus[ed] to hear’” about the mandatory ultrasound,316 victim blaming should be 
avoided.317 
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3. Endorsing the Right To Be Ignorant 
Some might argue that recognizing the right to attention is like granting or 
endorsing people with the right to be ignorant, which can be used as a way to insulate 
them from knowing important information. They fear that people would abuse their 
right to attention and block out the world. However, this criticism implicitly assumes 
being ignorant is necessarily “bad.” 
One district court concluded that “[t]he ‘constitutional right to be ignorant’ or ‘the 
constitutional right to remain uneducated,’ . . . simply does not exist [for inmates]”318 
but also noted that inmates “cannot be forced to learn” either.319 Admittedly, for strict 
liability law, there is no right to be ignorant320—individuals can be liable under strict 
liability even if they did not know of the law that they violated.321 But outside of the 
strict liability regime, it is within an individual’s privacy of personal knowledge to 
choose to know or not to know. If we are concerned about need-to-know information, 
the government can convey this information to everyone by meeting the intermediate 
scrutiny review.322 
This Article does not actually endorse the right to be ignorant. Rather, what this 
Article is trying to convey is that we have the right to our attention, and in the world 
of vast information, we should get to pick and choose which information we 
receive.323 The kind of slippery slope argument324 that focuses on one extreme end 
(i.e., knowing nothing) would unlikely become the reality because rather than falling 
at either extreme end, the reality tends to fall somewhere in the middle, the 
equilibrium between knowing everything and knowing nothing.  
CONCLUSION 
The dearth of scholarship from the information receiver’s perspective is 
problematic because the information receiver is often the “little guy” in the 
conversation. We own and are entitled to our attention, yet advertisement companies 
and scam artists freely bombard us with their “products” daily, resulting in our own 
time and monetary loss. Without recognizing the right to attention, contract 
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formation and informed consent (just to name a few) are hollow and superfluous: 
contracting parties have no meeting of the minds, and informed consent is giving 
consent without being informed. States could continue to freely mandate ultrasounds 
for pregnant women against their wills as though their attentions were not really 
theirs in the first place. Similarly, other problems in our daily lives that involve 
attention would likely continue to go unaddressed. 
This Article proposes legislation to recognize the right to attention as a statutory 
right, or alternatively, suggests that the courts recognize the right to attention as a 
common law right based on the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the right to 
attention’s much larger, as-yet-poorly-defined bundle of rights includes, for example, 
the right to deny attention when demanded, the right to be left alone, the right to not 
be spammed and the right not to receive ads when such advertisement is unwanted 
or uninvited, the right to waive the understanding of an agreement, the right to give 
consent without being informed, and the right not to be required to receive 
information against one’s will. 
This Article is the first to identify the right to attention, including its much larger, 
as-yet-poorly-defined bundle of rights. What this Article discusses—marketing, 
mandatory ultrasounds, informed consent, and contract formation—is in no way 
comprehensive of the right to attention’s practical implications. Like the right to 
privacy, the right to attention reaches far and wide. This Article invites further 
discussion to fully flesh out this novel body of law. 
